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Executive Summary 
Background 
The South Australian Government, elected in March 2018, has maintained its 
commitment to implement a rate capping regime for South Australian local government. 
The statutory framework for putting this commitment into effect is the proposed 
amendment to the Local Government Act 1999 – namely, the proposed Local 
Government (Rate Oversight) Amendment Bill 2018 – henceforth referred to as the Bill. 
The Bill establishes, among other things, a rate cap, mechanisms for councils to make 
rate variation applications, and provisions for monitoring and reporting.  
In addition, the South Australian Government has appointed the independent regulator 
– Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) – to be responsible for 
management of the scheme, including the formulation of guidance material for its 
implementation. At the time of writing, ESCOSA was yet to finalise arrangements for: 
rate cap determination methodologies; assessment process for rate variation 
applications; or monitoring and reporting arrangements. 
Purpose 
In July 2018 the University of Technology Sydney Centre for Local Government was 
commissioned to provide the Local Government Association of South Australia with 
recommendations for the Association and its membership to assist in their efforts to 
engage with the Marshall government on the implementation of a rate cap regime. 
In particular, the objectives set out included: 
• Offering a review of objectives and outcomes of rate capping based on 
academic literature. 
• Assess the fiscal implications of the rate caps for local governments in 
South Australia, including the associated implications for ratepayers.  
• Review the contents of the proposed Bill and suggest amendments that 
could address and clarify relevant matters 
• Discuss actions that councils should begin to implement in anticipation of 
rate capping. 
Methodology 
Review of academic literature 
The academic literature pertaining to taxation limitations for local government (or what 
we shall refer to as rate capping) has been consulted in this review. This is largely 
based from the United States context, but also, where applicable, the literature in 
Australia has been investigated. This includes important contributions on empirical 
assessments of long-run effects of rate capping in the New South Wales context. The 
literature consulted covers scholars that have recognised both positive and negative 
effects arising from rate capping. 
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Review of policy documents 
All policy documentation available at the time of engagement has been reviewed (25th 
July, 2018). This includes: ‘South Australia Local Government (Rate Oversight) 
Amendment Bill 2018’ and ‘Explanatory Paper Local Government (Rate Oversight) 
Amendment Bill 2018’, and the content of addresses by the Hon Minister Knoll and Mr 
Adam Wilson at the Local Government Association Special Meeting which took place 
on the 13th July, 2018. 
Data analysis and modelling 
Modelling was conducted to explore how the implementation of a rate cap regime in 
South Australia might be expected to affect revenue – assuming that the Bill is passed 
in its current form, with special consideration of effects on high growth councils and 
inter-jurisdictional equity. Data on the quantum of general rates and the number of 
properties in each council area was provided by the Local Government Association of 
South Australia. In addition, data was collected based on several indexes – namely: the 
Adelaide Consumer Price Index, South Australian Local Government Price Index, and 
the Wage Price Index (WPI). 
Findings 
Current imposts in South Australia are already relatively low, though 
dependence on rate revenue is relatively high 
 On the whole, increases to total local government imposts are higher in NSW than 
for South Australia – certainly for the last 5 years.  
 Indeed, growth in total impost over the last ten years have generally been 
much lower for business and households in South Australia than for the 
other two states.  
 South Australian local governments have far more reliance on rates for revenue 
than do their peers in NSW, and Victoria. 
Rate capping based on index factors may result in lower and more volatile 
revenues, with the likelihood of many applications for rate variation 
determinations 
 Comparable indexes indicate that a rate cap is likely to be subject to high volatility – 
with potential implications for spending volatility and also financial sustainability 
considerations.  
 In 2016/17 rate capping could have resulted in potential taxation revenues foregone 
ranging from $117 million through to $133 million. 
o This includes material effects on total revenue for individual councils, 
ranging from a reduction of 4.53 per cent through to a reduction of 9.00 
per cent. 
o This would have resulted in the far majority of councils requiring 
application for a variation determination in order to avoid significant 
reductions to revenue. 
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 On the whole, the impact of an efficiency dividend has a relatively small effect on 
potential revenue foregone (when compared to the effect of the volatility in indices 
or the compounding effect of successive caps). 
Rate capping could result in undesirable outcomes for ratepayers over time 
 Councils may well be forced to reduce the quantity and quality of goods and 
services if the cap does not keep up with changes to the cost of provision. 
 What this generally means for residents and businesses is: 
o an initial period of reduced quantity and quality of goods whilst council 
first seeks to absorb the shortfall (for example poorer road maintenance 
over this period), followed by  
o a rate shock, whereby the compounded value of the rate shortfall, 
accrued over a number of years, is applied to local government 
ratepayers all at once.  
An undue emphasis on implementing a ‘cheap’ index overlooks many relevant 
considerations for index construction 
 An undue focus on a cheap methodology (including a cheap index) is not reflective 
of the large sums of money involved in a rate cap regime and the large expense 
associated with using an inappropriate index and methodology 
 Summative indexes can be distortionary, with a need for, at the very least, tailored 
indexes (such as designed for urban, rural, regional councils and fringe/growth 
classes of local governments).  
A range of additional considerations should be addressed to maximise 
effectiveness of rate capping regimes 
 Special conditions should apply for high growth councils;  
 A reasonable level of interjurisdictional equity should be preserved and due regard 
given to capacity to pay;  
 Ensure that councils have the flexibility to tailor imposts to local economic 
conditions;  
 Discourage councils from applying the maximum cap as a default option; 
 Ensure transparency independence and political accountability in the rate cap 
setting process; and  
 Ensure that any efficiency dividend imposed actually reflects gains in efficiency 
rather than cuts to service levels or service quality.  
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Recommendations 
Rec 1. A contemporary, robust and evidence-based inquiry is important to 
ensure no deleterious and unanticipated interaction effects arise. 
Rec 2. A comprehensive and ongoing suite of performance measures are 
required to support implementation, council response to implementation 
(including requests for rate cap variation determinations), and to allow for an 
evidence-based review of the legislation by a truly independent party in due 
course.  
Rec 3. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill 
to ensure that it does not disproportionally disadvantage councils in high 
growth areas, or councils where growth is ‘lumpy’.  
Rec 4. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill 
to ensure that it does not widen the gap in inter-jurisdictional inequity over 
time.  
Rec 5. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill 
to ensure that it specifically takes account of capacity to pay (which was an 
objective of the policy). 
Rec 6. Current levels of rating need to be interrogated to ensure that the 
underlying assumption essential for the Bill to attain its objectives – that 
initial rating positions reflect both need and willingness to pay – are indeed 
valid.  
Rec 7. The proposed rate cap regime must respond to demographic shifts.  
Rec 8. The rate cap Bill and methodology must include a catch-up provision.  
Rec 9. The rate cap should be tailored to specific classes of councils.  
Rec 10. To ensure both independence and political accountability the rate cap 
should be set according to a two-stage process. First, independence is 
achieved by having ESCOSA make its public recommendations for the 
various classes of councils (fully detailing the basis for same). Second, 
political accountability is introduced by having the Minister declare the rate 
caps that will be applied (detailing the basis for his declaration if it differs to 
the ESCOSA recommendation).  
Rec 11. The inflationary factor used to guide rate cap determinations should 
meet the following desirable characteristics: accepted by stakeholders, 
resistant to manipulation, transparent, representative of actual unit costs and 
the contribution that they make to typical local government expenditure, 
empirically robust and reliable.  
Rec 12. Individual councils and the Local Government Association should 
consider collecting comprehensive data on unit costs for local government 
expenditures, which will guide recommendations, requests for rate cap 
variation determinations, and review of the Bill.  
Rec 13. The review of the Bill must not be completed by the parties 
responsible for implementation of the rate cap regime (ESCOSA or the 
Minister’s Office) to avoid clear moral hazard.  
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Structure of report 
The structure of this report is as follows: 
 In the first section we briefly review the literature on rate capping with a 
particular emphasis on proposing solutions to minimise known negative 
side-effects of rate capping. We also briefly consider the disparity between 
early policy documents and the proposed Bill, noting shifts away from some 
initial policy commitments.  
 In Section 2 we consider the potential fiscal implications arising from the 
introduction of a rate cap regime – specifically we produce evidence which 
suggests that claims regarding the comparative outcomes from rate 
capping in the Eastern States may have been somewhat misleading.  
 In Section 3 we provide detail of the likely effects that a rate capping regime 
may have on residents and businesses in South Australia. In particular, we 
draw attention to the potential for a poorly administered rate cap regime to give 
rise to significant levels of rate shock and also hamper local government’s 
flexibility to respond to local economic shocks.  
 In Section 4, we review the proposed indexes and methodology that we 
have been able to glean from the very scant detail in the public domain. We 
note that none of the proposed indexes are fit for purpose and detail possible 
consequences which may arise from inadequate methodology.  
 In Section 5 we detail, section by section, important changes that should be 
made to the Bill to minimise the likelihood of unanticipated deleterious 
outcomes.  
 Section 6 provides a brief review of the enormous number of tasks to which 
councils must apply themselves to in order to be prepared for the 
introduction of a rate cap regime. We conclude our report with an enumeration 
of our key recommendations. 
 
 Rate Capping in South Australia  6 
1. Introduction to Rate Capping and 
the Local Government (Rate 
Oversight) Amendment Bill 2018 
There is a relatively large literature on taxation limitations for local government (or what 
we shall refer to as rate capping) based mainly on the United States context – where 
the practice has been relatively widespread as a result of the ‘taxpayer revolt’ and 
associated referenda. However, the literature in Australia is somewhat nascent – 
notwithstanding some important contributions on empirical assessments of long run 
effects of rate capping arising from the four decade experiment in New South Wales 
(see, Drew and Dollery, 2015; Drew and Dollery, 2016; Grant and Drew, 2017). 
Generally, scholars have recognised both positive and negative effects arising from 
rate capping and it is important for us to briefly outline the arguments because they 
suggest ways in which the Bill might be altered with a view to ensuring that maximum 
benefits are captured, and deleterious consequences are avoided or minimised. 
1.1 Benefits, costs, and unexpected consequences of rate 
capping 
1.1.1 Benefits of rate capping 
The main benefit proposed in relation to rate capping is that it acts to constrain 
monopoly powers. In economics the favoured position is competition as it is generally 
accepted that competition will exert downward pressure on prices and increase 
economic efficiency. By way of contrast, monopolies are generally frowned upon 
because the existence of only a single provider means that prices may be set 
inappropriately high. Indeed, because local government has coercive powers afforded 
to it under enabling legislation (Local Government Act 1999) – particularly with respect 
to local government’s ability to recover outstanding payments – the problems generally 
associated with monopolistic providers may well be more pronounced than in other 
sectors1. Rate capping probably does offer a constraint against monopoly powers, 
although it is by no means the only way of introducing constraints (other options are to 
reduce powers in legislation, introduce competition by making more services 
contestable, or set up functionally overlapping competing jurisdictions as a basis for 
producing some local government goods and services – see, Boadway and Shah, 
2009).  
A second benefit of rate capping is that it, not surprisingly, reduces gross taxation 
imposts on local government ratepayers. Drew and Dollery (2016) empirically 
demonstrated that imposts were relatively lower for New South Wales ratepayers than 
they were for peers in Victoria and attributed the lower imposts to the existence of a 
rate cap regime. Other cited benefits to rate capping are more controversial and may 
not be supported by empirical evidence. These benefits include: enhanced 
governance (although others have argued that a rate cap provides a default option 
and hence has a negative effect on governance); limiting the provision of non-core 
                                                        
 
1
 For instance, Australia Post has a monopoly on mail delivery but they do not have the power to compel people to buy postage 
stamps. 
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services (which may also have significant equity implications for the most vulnerable in 
our society); and improvement to technical efficiency (defined as the conversion of 
inputs into outputs, which is not supported by the empirical evidence – see Drew and 
Dollery 2016). 
1.1.2 Costs of rate capping 
There are also a number of problems that have been associated with rate capping – 
and, once again, some of the claims are supported by evidence but others are 
somewhat controversial. The obvious ‘problem’ with rate capping is that it limits 
revenue streams for local governments and this can have implications for local 
government capacity to provide services in response to community need, ability to 
adequately maintain infrastructure, and capacity to build new infrastructure. 
Infrastructure backlogs are a particularly pressing problem in jurisdictions where rate 
cap regimes operate and there is empirical evidence to support the contention that this 
is an unwanted side-effect of rate capping (Drew and Dollery, 2016). It has also been 
demonstrated empirically that rate capping gives rise to higher levels of municipal 
debt (Drew and Dollery 2016), which has clear implications for financial sustainability 
and intergenerational equity (it is difficult to morally defend running up debt for services 
consumed that future generations of local government taxpayers will be required to foot 
the bill for – however, some have argued that some debt is desirable for long-lived 
infrastructure assets as these will also be consumed by future generations2). 
1.1.3 Unexpected consequences of rate capping 
1.1.3.1 Political side-effects 
There are also a number of political side-effects associated with rate capping. One 
argument is that it runs contrary to democratic principles – that is, that the elected 
representatives who are held to account, in part, for the responsiveness of council to 
community need are hampered by an inability to raise revenues to pay for the 
perceived needs (although where jurisdictions allow for rate cap variation 
determinations then this argument is not quite as strong). It has also been noted that 
the operation and announcement of a rate cap each year can be easily confused by 
the public as a message that all councils can be sustainably operated by simply 
increasing taxation revenues by the capped amount (when in fact the particular 
circumstances of a given council may require significantly higher imposts). Related to 
this is the political risk associated with applying for a rate cap variation 
determination (which explains why just 13 out of the 128 councils in NSW applied for 
a special rate variation in 2018-19 despite the fact that the Fit For the Future 
programme assessed around 60 percent of councils as being unsustainable3). Another 
less known, and rather perverse consequence of rate capping, is that it tends to result 
in councils increasing rates by the maximum cap each year (partly as a result of a 
fear of missing out on compounded revenue if they fail to increase rates by the 
                                                        
 
2
 There are a number of problems with this argument. First it conveniently neglects the fact that the current generation of 
ratepayers were the beneficiaries of infrastructure paid for in full by their predecessors. Second, local government spending is 
quite fungible – that is, debt can be taken on ostensibly to pay for long-lived assets and the funds which had been reserved for 
such assets can then be re-directed to services that are consumed in the short-run. Third, no jurisdiction currently assesses 
debt capacity in a robust and empirically defensible manner – which is akin to encouraging one to take on a mortgage without 
checking their payslips. Grant and Drew (2017) look at this problem in some depth and expose some of the flaws in the local 
government debt argument. 
3
 Interestingly IPART (the very same authority responsible for setting the rate cap in NSW) was one of the parties (in conjunct ion 
with Ernst & Young) who came up with the determination that 60 percent of the councils in NSW were not financially fit for the 
future. 
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maximum amount) and putting relatively less effort into consulting with the community 
(because the independent regulator has already endorsed increases up to the cap 
there is less need to justify increases within the cap envelope to the community).  
Another political consequence of rate capping is that it allows local governments to 
shift blame to others (either the state government – if the Minister must set the cap – 
or to a politically unaccountable bureaucracy) for their financial condition rather than 
taking proactive steps to address sustainability challenges (ILGRP, 2013). Associated 
with this is the concept of learned helplessness, whereby elected representatives and 
executives as a result of unsuccessful rate variation determinations and low rate caps 
slowly lose the motivation to help themselves out of various predicaments (even 
situations where revenue is not the cause of the problem – Grant and Drew, 2017). 
1.1.3.2 Unexpected financial consequences 
Scholars have also identified rate gaming to be a consequence of rate capping, 
whereby local governments increase fees and introduce new levies (such as the now 
ubiquitous environmental levy in NSW) in order to sidestep the cap (Drew and Dollery, 
2015). In addition, it has been claimed that rate capping results in ‘millions of dollars 
[which] are spent each year by councils and State agencies on preparing, reviewing 
and determining applications’ (ILGRP 2013, p. 43) – and that this represents an 
unacceptable pecuniary cost to taxpayers (especially in conditions of fiscal austerity).  
Rate capping can also result in reduced flexibility with respect to tailoring imposts to 
local economic conditions. This is a particular problem in rural areas where many 
local governments try to time additional imposts to coincide with profitable agricultural 
conditions and reduce imposts when agricultural conditions are difficult (for instance 
during droughts).  
1.1.3.3 Inter-jurisdictional equity considerations 
Rate capping also invariably results in inter-jurisdictional inequity and a breaking of the 
nexus between rates levied and capacity to pay. Inter-jurisdictional inequity refers to 
the situation whereby the rate of local government taxation is vastly different in various 
council areas. For example, in 2012 Ku-ring-gai NSW (which had a median the 
average wage of $51,937) the average residential rates were $780.15, but in 
Wollongong (where the median wage for the same period was $44,970) the average 
residential rate was $1,011.95.  
Variations in inter-jurisdictional equity are objectionable on moral grounds but they 
also have significant implications for wider economic efficiency because inequities can 
distort spending decisions (for instance where one might choose to locate a factory 
or office).  
Breaking of the nexus between the amount of rates levied and the capacity of residents 
to pay the rates is an even weightier problem. Because of the compounding effects of 
rate-capping, combined with demographic shifts over time, any rate cap regime will 
almost certainly destroy the association between median wage of residents in the area 
and the rates levied by local governments (Drew and Dollery, 2015). This is a big 
problem given that rate capping is generally motivated in the first place by concerns 
regarding taxpayer capacity. Drew and Dollery (2015) provided robust econometric 
evidence to show a negative association between revenue effort and average wage for 
NSW local government, at the highest level of statistical significance.  
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What this means is that rate capping in NSW has largely resulted in areas with the 
lowest average wages being asked to carry the highest relative burden of 
taxation, which is clearly undesirable. Perhaps an equally damning criticism of rate 
capping is that it may not lead to individual rates assessments being constrained 
to the value of the cap at all. This failure to cap at the level of the rate assessment 
can cause great consternation among local government taxpayers and occurs due to 
changes in relative valuation of properties, rezoning of land, or variation to rate cap 
determinations.  
1.2 Some Solutions to Problems Associated with Rate 
Capping 
The long list of problems that have been associated with rate capping makes for 
sobering reading. However, careful crafting of legislation and methodologies can 
mitigate some of these deleterious effects and is consistent with our brief to identify 
what changes can be made to proposed legislation and methodologies if a political 
decision is made to implement rate capping in South Australia. Table 1 lists the various 
problems and briefly outlines potential solutions (which may only partially address the 
problem as some problems cannot be eliminated entirely). Readers should note that at 
this point in the Report we are only trying to provide a brief overview of potential 
solutions and that the remainder of the report will deal with the solutions in greater 
detail (we also reiterate the main changes that should be sought to the proposed rate 
capping legislation in our list of recommendations at the end of this report). 
Table 1. Problems Associated with Rate Capping and Potential Solutions 
Problem Possible Solutions 
Rate capping constrains 
revenue 
1. The process for rate variation 
determinations must be relatively 
straightforward and accessible to 
councils. 
2. Rates, if they are to be constrained, 
should only be used to fund public 
goods and services, and the subsidy 
component of merit goods and goods 
with positive externalities4. All other 
goods and services should be funded 
through fees which recover the entire 
cost of provision. This is good 
taxation practice at any time (and is 
the most economically and ethically 
appropriate way of delivering 
services), but is essential at times 
when taxation revenues are capped. 
                                                        
 
4
 Merit goods are local government outputs that are considered to be virtuous – such as libraries (which encourage people to 
read). Goods with positive externalities are outputs for which consumption by one person bestows benefits onto others – an 
example is rubbish collection, which has benefits for the householder but also for the householder’s neighbours who might 
otherwise be exposed to unsightly and smelly waste. In this later case economic theory states that the service should be 
subsidised by the amount of the benefit conferred onto others.  
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Rate capping is associated with 
higher levels of debt and lower 
financial sustainability. 
It is critical that debt is only taken on for bona 
fide expenditure on long-lived assets. There 
needs to be close monitoring of debt levels and 
an automatic trigger in place to require councils 
to apply for a rate variation determination in the 
event that debt rises above appropriate levels. 
Indeed a full suite of robust performance 
monitoring metrics must be in place so that:  
(i) an assessment can be made of how 
rate capping has affected sustainability,  
(ii) to guide decision making by councils, 
and  
(iii) to be used as a trigger for rate variation 
applications and to guide the actual 
determination process (and hence 
reduce costs associated with the 
process) 
Rate capping can run counter to 
democratic principles 
Making the process for a rate variation 
determination accessible will partly address 
this problem. In addition, it is critical that the 
wording of announcements is clear that the 
rate cap simply conveys the maximum rate 
increase that should apply to a ‘typical’ council 
that is not facing unmet community need, 
financial sustainability concerns or 
infrastructure backlogs. The statement should 
also clearly convey that it is prudent for 
councils that require additional revenues to 
apply for a rate cap variation determination. 
Finally, there must be some political 
accountability built into the process – if not at 
the local government level then it must occur at 
the level of the Minister for Local Government 
(by requiring the Minister to set the cap after 
receiving an independent recommendation 
from an appropriately qualified body – more on 
this below). 
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Rate cap announcements can 
confuse the public regarding the 
appropriate level of rate 
increases for a specific local 
government 
It is critical that the rate cap announcement is 
crafted carefully so that residents are clear on 
two points:  
(i) that the cap does not reflect the specific 
circumstances of their council and that 
it may be prudent for the council to 
seek a variation to the cap, and  
(ii) that the cap does not represent a cap 
on increases to individual assessments 
and that individual imposts may 
therefore rise by an amount greater 
than the cap 
Applying for a rate cap variation 
entails significant political risk 
Political risk can be mitigated in two 
ways:  
1. First, as we have already noted, it is 
imperative that the announcement is 
worded carefully to convey the fact that 
the cap is not specific to any particular 
council and that it may be prudent for 
councils to pursue a rate cap variation. 
2. Second, there must be automatic 
triggers in place, whereby a council 
must apply for a variation determination 
if certain metrics are not met – this will 
ensure that citizens understand that the 
impetus for applying for a variation is 
the circumstances that the council finds 
itself in. 
Rate capping tends to result in 
councils applying the maximum 
cap each year (even if situations 
may not warrant such increases) 
This occurs because councils rightly perceive 
that failing to increase by the maximum cap will 
have compounded effects on future revenue or 
will result in the need to pursue what might be 
a time consuming and expensive (in both 
pecuniary and political terms) rate cap variation 
determination.  
A simple solution to this problem is to legislate 
and allow for councils to be able to ‘catch-up’ – 
that is, should a council not increase the 
general rate by the maximum cap amount, in a 
given year then in future years the council will 
have the opportunity to make additional 
increases that would capture the compounded 
effects of revenue foregone in earlier periods, 
without the need to apply for a variation. 
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Rate capping may erode political 
accountability 
There must be some transparency in the 
process of setting any type of taxation.  
• If accountability is eroded at the 
local government level then it must 
be accommodated at the state 
government level – that is, the 
Minister must make the declaration 
(in response to the independent 
recommendation) so that citizens 
have some avenue to hold some 
level of political representation to 
account for the consequences of 
any given increase in taxation.  
• Moreover, to ensure full 
accountability and an appropriate 
level of rigour in the decision the 
Minister must be required to make a 
full disclosure regarding the 
reasons for the Minister’s decision if 
it does not accord with the 
independent recommendation.  
In so doing, the rate cap regime would 
capture both desirable attributes – 
independence and political accountability. 
Rate capping can result in 
gaming of the cap 
Anti-gaming provisions must be included in the 
legislation and appropriate oversight must 
occur to ensure that the provisions are 
complied with. 
Rate capping entails very large 
administration costs 
As much as possible the rate cap variation 
process must use existing plans and 
community consultations. In addition, if the rate 
cap regime is supported by a sufficiently robust 
suite of performance monitoring metrics then 
costs will be further tempered. 
Rate capping reduces council 
flexibility to set revenue to 
reflect prevailing community 
conditions 
This offers further impetus for the legislation to 
include an appropriate catch-up provision. 
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Rate capping gives rise to inter-
jurisdiction inequity (which has 
both ethical and economic side-
effects) 
It is critical that initial rating positions reflect an 
acceptable level of inter-jurisdictional equity. 
To ensure this occurs,  
1. Revenue effort metrics (total imposts 
levied by a local government as a 
percentage of the median income of 
ratepayers in the local government 
area) must be calculated for all local 
governments and the introduction of 
the rate cap regime should be 
delayed for an entire cycle to allow 
councils to alter their level of imposts 
to equalise positions if community 
consultation is supportive of 
increases.  
2. Moreover, the revenue effort metric 
should be considered an essential 
element of a rigorous performance 
monitoring system and should be 
monitored.  
3. Finally, the independent regulator 
and the Minister should be directed 
in the legislation to give reasonable 
regard to inter-jurisdictional equity in 
setting the cap and assessing rate 
cap variations. 
Rate capping can result in a 
breaking of the nexus between 
taxation imposts and capacity to 
pay 
1. The above recommendations 
regarding revenue effort metrics will 
partly address this problem.  
2. There is also a strong case to review 
financial assistance grant allocations 
with respect to need and capacity to 
pay.  
3. Failure to adequately pay due regard 
to revenue effort metrics will result in 
the erosion of the nexus over time as 
the demographics (make-up of rate 
payers) shift through internal 
migration or the establishment of 
new industries and the like. 
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Individual rates assessments 
may still exceed the rate cap by 
large margins 
1. It is not possible to apply the cap to 
individual assessments as this would 
erode intra-jurisdictional equity.  
2. Therefore it is critical that ratepayers 
are educated appropriately by the 
government introducing the regime 
so that misconceptions are 
addressed.  
3. It is also important to ensure that the 
wording of the rate cap 
announcement accurately conveys 
what the cap applies to. 
1.3 The Objectives of South Australia’s Rate Cap Policy and 
Legislation 
Our critique of the proposed Bill and methodology are based on the most up-to-date 
materials as at engagement (25th July, 2018). These include ‘South Australia Local 
Government (Rate Oversight) Amendment Bill 2018’ and ‘Explanatory Paper Local 
Government (Rate Oversight) Amendment Bill 2018’, and the content of addresses by 
the Hon Minister Knoll and Mr Adam Wilson at the Local Government Association 
Special Meeting which took place on the 13th July, 2018. 
1.3.1 Pre-Election Policy Materials 
In the publication Capping Your Council Rates issued before the election a number of 
commitments were made regarding particulars of the rate capping policy. Specifically 
voters were advised that: 
 ‘The scheme will be administered by an independent regulator’ (Marshall, 2018, 
p. 3). There needs to be independence worked into the process of setting a rate 
cap, so this part of the policy was sound. However, there also needs to be 
some political accountability in democratic institutions (thus leading to our 
recommendation above that the Minister should declare the rate cap either by 
confirming the Minister’s acceptance of the recommendation of the independent 
regulator, or fully detailing his reasons for declaring a cap contrary to the 
recommendation of the independent regulator should this occur).  
 ‘The regulator will determine a rate cap on a region by region basis, recognising 
that council costs can vary between regions’ (Marshall, 2018, p. 3). This was 
very sound policy and reflects the findings of a host of empirical studies over 
the years that demonstrate that expenditure need and unit cost vary 
substantially by region and that differences between urban, rural, regional and 
growth areas are particularly acute. Indeed TCorp (The NSW Treasury 
Corporation; 2013, p. 29), which was charged with reviewing financial 
sustainability of NSW councils where a rate cap applies noted that ‘there are 
distinct variances in cost structure between Urban and Rural councils [and that] 
Rural Councils tend to have a lower component of cost from employees and a 
larger component from construction work.’ Thus a single statewide index would 
not adequately reflect unit costs for all local governments (because of the 
different mix of components). Moreover, there are less opportunities to 
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outsource provision of services to commercial operators in rural areas which 
means that councils have less avenues for pursuing efficiency measures. 
Indeed, given the vast distances involved it is generally also less viable to 
pursue shared service arrangements in rural areas. Therefore the Marshall 
commitment was sound policy that reflected the situation on the ground. 
 ‘The regulator will apply the Local Government Price Index (LGPI) as the basis 
for determining a rate cap’ (Marshall, 2018, p. 3). The LGPI may not be the 
most appropriate index to apply as this was not the purpose for which it was 
designed (see below for a discussion of the ideal attributes of any rate cap 
index). It is certainly not appropriate to use a state-wide LGPI (especially one 
that uses capital city CPI as a major input) for determining region by region 
caps. In addition there are a number of other factors that we have already noted 
must be considered in formulating a recommendation for a cap. 
 ‘Individual councils will be able to apply to the independent regu lator for a rate 
increase above the cap when able to demonstrate support of ratepayers’ 
(Marshall, 2018, p. 3). This policy position adds significant community 
consultation costs to the process of applying for a rate cap variation. It also 
increases the political cost of doing so. 
 ‘Councils will also be able to seek recognition as a ‘Growth Area’ for a 
maximum of up to five years to support an application for an above rate cap’ 
(Marshall, 2018, p. 3). It is certainly the case that high growth councils are likely 
to feel the impact of rate capping more so than other councils – so in this sense 
the policy was sound. However, to reduce both pecuniary and political costs 
(and ensure that councils which need the special dispensation do indeed 
receive it) the determination of whether a council represents a ‘Growth Area’ 
should be made by the independent regulator according to reasonable and 
transparent criteria – that is, it should not be up to councils to make an 
application. 
 ‘Five years after its introduction, a Liberal Government will review the Rate 
Capping Scheme in consultation with local government’ (Marshall, 2018, p. 3). 
This statement is a little peculiar because it implicitly assumes that a Liberal 
government will be in power after the next election. It is critical for both political 
accountability and for the objective of a thorough review that the Parliament 
associated with the introduction of the policy is also the Parliament that 
appraises the policy (because the current parliamentarians will have a better 
knowledge of the contents of the debates relating to the Bill). Moreover, it must 
be noted at the outset that policies are rarely reversed. Indeed the economic 
luminary Milton Friedman (1993) contended that policies were rarely reversed 
because even if they prove to be completely ineffective or even 
counterproductive there will be entities that have a vested interest in ensuring 
the policy continues (usually so that power and budgets associated with the 
policy are maintained). This is why it is imperative that the entity that is 
appointed as the independent regulator has no part in the appraisal of the policy 
when it is reviewed.  
 ‘A Liberal government will not continue Labor’s cost-shifting to local councils’ 
(Marshall, 2018, p.3). It is sound policy to eschew cost-shifting and it will be 
critical for the financial sustainability of councils under a rate cap regime to 
reject cost-shifting. However, given that the policy document acknowledges 
 
 Rate Capping in South Australia  16 
past cost-shifting it will also seem critical for the government to actively roll back 
extant cost-shifting devices. 
 ‘Why we’re doing it…the rising cost of living is putting undue pressure on South 
Australian households and businesses’ (Marshall, 2018, p. 4). As we have 
noted earlier the evidence suggests that rate capping may not indeed reduce 
cost of living pressures (particularly in view of the fact that the rate cap 
generally becomes the default option for councils). This is why measures such 
as catch-up provisions, appropriately worded statements accompanying the 
rate cap declaration, directions that the cap must be set with due regard to 
revenue effort metrics and the like (detailed in Table 1) are critical to ensure the 
legislation achieves the policy objective. 
 Various justifications are given for introducing a rate cap: ‘Council rates are one 
of the biggest taxes home owners pay on an annual basis’ (Marshall,2018, p. 4) 
– this is clearly misleading for most employed persons and businesses. ‘In 
recent years council rates have increased well above inflation’ – this will be 
tested below. Claims are also made about the superior outcomes in New South 
Wales where a rate cap has operated for over 40 years. We have already 
provided a brief review of the robust and peer-reviewed empirical evidence 
regarding rate cap outcomes in NSW which tends to paint a dismal picture of 
the rate regime operating in that state. 
1.3.2 Proposed Bill 
At this point we are mainly interested in looking at the objectives as stated in the Bill 
and comparing key details articulated in the policy document of the Marshall 
government (which contained many sound recommendations) with the amendment Bill 
actually introduced. 
The objectives of the Bill are outlined in Part 1A, section 187C to ensure: 
a) That the financial contribution of ratepayers to the provision of services and 
infrastructure by local government to meet the present and future needs of local 
communities is subject to appropriate oversight 
b) That a council has the financial capacity to perform its duties and functions and 
exercise its powers 
Curiously the main rationale as articulated in the policy promotional materials – to 
reduce undue cost of living pressures for residents and business – is not explicitly 
articulated in s187C. There is a strong risk that the Bill may not achieve this policy 
objective unless several changes are made to its contents and the proposed 
methodology (see Sections 4 and 5). We urge that consideration be given to including 
the policy objective clearly in s187C to guide implementation.  
We also note that reference is made to the ‘present and future needs of local 
communities’ and adequate ‘financial capacity’ – these are both financial sustainability 
concepts and could be captured by this single term. Indeed, given the risk to financial 
sustainability that accompanies rate cap regimes it would be prudent to mention this 
specifically as an objective to guide implementation and to introduce the 
recommendations that we detail in this Report to ensure that sustainability is not 
allowed to deteriorate. 
In Table 2 below we detail whether the particulars contained in the policy document 
also appear in the proposed Bill: 
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Table 2. Comparison of Policy to Proposed Bill 
Policy Document Proposed Bill 
Scheme will be administered by an 
independent regulator 
ESCOSA is nominated as the 
independent regulator 
Rate cap will be determined on a 
region by region basis 
The proposed Bill allows for the cap to 
be applied to: 
(a) councils generally; or  
(b) a class of councils; or  
(c) a particular council.  
This section is inconsistent with the pre-
election policy document as it does not 
require ESCOSA to determine a cap on 
a region by region basis (it is also 
inconsistent with best practice and the 
extant evidence). The inconsistency 
could quickly be rectified by deleting (a). 
The LGPI will be employed 
S187E(3)(a) only requires the basis for 
the primary rate cap to be ‘a relevant 
price or cost index’. It therefore appears 
that the Bill has backed away from the 
commitment made in the policy 
documentation.  
As we will detail later, no existing index 
meets minimum requirements for an 
effective and sustainable rate cap regime 
targeted to the varied circumstances of 
councils operating in different regions. 
Individual councils will be able to 
apply for a rate increase above the 
cap 
S187G outlines the process for applying 
for a rate cap variation determination 
Councils will be able to seek 
recognition as a ‘Growth Area’ 
S187G does not prevent an application 
for a variation on the basis of a council 
being in a ‘growth area’, but neither does 
it specifically accommodate the 
commitment made in policy documents.  
As detailed earlier the designation as a 
‘growth area’ should be made by 
ESCOSA based on reasonable and 
transparent criteria and not require the 
council to apply for same (although 
councils should not be prevented from 
applying to be designated a growth area 
if they feel that it is appropriate). 
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Five years after implementation the 
scheme will be reviewed 
‘9-Review’, details that a review and 
report should be completed by 31 
December 2023. This seems to presume 
that the legislation will be passed before 
the end of the year.  
As noted earlier it is more efficient and 
accords better with principles of political 
accountability for the Parliament that 
passes the legislation to be responsible 
for its review. It is critical that parties with 
an apprehension of bias (for instance 
ESCOSA) are not included in the review 
process – ideally a completely 
independent institution from another 
state which has demonstrated expertise 
in this field (including peer-reviewed 
scholarly expertise) should be nominated 
as the party producing the report on the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the 
scheme. 
1.3.3 General Comments on the Rate Cap Policy 
1.3.3.1 Wider policy package 
Generally, it is considered risky to tinker with one narrow aspect of policy relating to a 
public institution, because it can easily give rise to unanticipated deleterious interaction 
effects (social scientists refer to sequential narrow policy prescriptions as the 
synergistic fallacy and there is a very large literature demonstrating bad side-effects as 
a result of tinkering – see Hirschman 1991). It is particularly problematic in this case 
because attention is only being paid to one side of the accounting ledger (revenue) and 
it is very difficult to see how the policy can be sustainable without a prescription (rather 
than a simple hope for vaguely defined efficiencies) for measures to reduce 
expenditure. Ideally, rate capping would only be introduced in the context of a wide 
ranging contemporary inquiry into local government finances and would be but one of a 
raft of measures (including expenditure measures). The Hon Minister Knoll stated at 
the Special Meeting that this was the first of a plan for a number of reforms, however, 
there can be no certainty that the future unspecified reforms will indeed come to pass. 
We would urge the South Australian government to defer this policy implementation 
until all the policy prescriptions have been worked out, communicated to the public and 
are ready for implementation.  
1.3.3.2 Public communication to avoid misconceptions 
We are also concerned that many people may misconceive what the implementation of 
a rate cap would mean for their personal local government taxation assessments. We 
encourage the government and various local government peak bodies to actively go 
about educating the public regarding the fact that rate capping may not necessarily be 
directly reflected in a cap on one’s personal rates (for all of the reasons we raised 
above). In addition, as we have already noted, it is essential that the rate cap is 
carefully communicated to ratepayers so that its full implications are accurately 
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conveyed – including the fact that the rate cap does not reflect the specific 
circumstances of any particular council and that it may still be prudent for the council to 
apply for and receive a rate variation determination. 
1.3.3.3 Alternative means to achieve oversight and financial capacity objectives 
We also note that the current objectives as stated in the proposed Bill – oversight and 
financial capacity – do not require the introduction of a rate cap regime. For instance, 
oversight could be conducted through a body charged with monitoring rate increases 
and investigating any council which prima facie appeared to be introducing undue 
pressures onto household and business budgets. An oversight body thus conceived, 
could be made accessible to members of the public who could register their concerns 
which might be used as an impetus for investigation. Indeed, if a comprehensive 
performance monitoring framework was implemented it would be easier for residents to 
monitor matters and draw attention to them and exert political pressure if they thought it 
was warranted. An oversight scheme of this nature would be less costly to administer 
and operate on the assumption that most councils are doing the right thing (rather than 
the implicit assumption of rate cap regimes which is that most councils are placing 
unreasonable imposts on ratepayers) – it would also transfer much of the burden from 
councils to an appropriately resourced regulator who could harness economies of scale 
and in-house expertise to produce the desired oversight at a much reduced cost. Drew 
and Dollery (2016) discuss a number of alternative measures to rate capping in some 
detail. 
1.3.3.4 Summary 
On the evidence presented above one can conclude that the Bill strays some way from 
the original intent of the public policy and moreover that the Bill in its current form is 
likely to lead to a number of unanticipated deleterious consequences. In the next 
section we empirically investigate some of the claims made by opposing parties 
regarding the costs and benefits of rate capping.  
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2. Fiscal Implications for Local 
Government in South Australia 
In this section we take a brief overview of revenue for South Australian local 
government relative to its peers in New South Wales and Victoria. We then conduct 
some modelling to explore how the implementation of a rate cap regime in South 
Australia might be expected to affect revenue – assuming that the Bill is passed in its 
current form. Following this we briefly consider the effect of a rate cap regime on high 
growth councils and inter-jurisdictional equity. 
2.1 Comparing Local Government Revenue 
Below we depict various aspects of local government revenue. Comparisons are made 
with the two jurisdictions which currently operate rate cap regimes, which is consistent 
with the focus of rate cap debates thus far. The data is derived from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2018), Local Government Finance Statistics reports (for 
each state and for Australia) and augmented with number of assessment data. 
A lot of the debate regarding the potential introduction of rate capping to South 
Australia has drawn attention to the relatively low levels of local government taxation 
that occur in New South Wales. Figure 1 confirms that local government rates per 
assessment are considerably lower in New South Wales than in either South Australia 
or Victoria and it is thus not unreasonable to claim that the forty year rate cap regime 
has been successful in reducing the impost via taxation. However, if one is concerned 
about relative cost of living pressures in the various jurisdictions then it is also 
important to examine two other key statistics – annual growth rates in taxation, and 
annual growth rate in total own-source revenue.  
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Figure 2 presents comparative data on the annual growth rate in taxation (expressed 
on a per assessment basis). Like all graphs and statistics, the picture one takes away 
is determined in part by the time horizon that one views the data through. We present 
the data derived from ten years of statistics, consistent with what is provided in the 
most recent ABS reports, however one could argue that what has occurred in the last 
five years or so is more relevant for contemporary decision making. If we compare 
growth rates over this period then it is reasonable to assert that growth rates in South 
Australian local government taxation have generally been above NSW, but slightly 
below average increases in Victoria. 
Figure 2. Taxation Revenue Annual Growth Rates, per assessment (percentage 
change) 
 
However, given the evidence that rate caps are often ‘gamed’ by councils and the fact 
that the motivation for introducing rate capping is to contain cost of living pressures 
(which are affected by both local government taxation and fees), it is critical to also 
examine average annual growth rates per assessment for total own-source revenues 
(we have excluded grants and subsidies in the graph below given that councils do not 
directly collect these revenues – see the appendix for the relevant graph without grants 
and subsidies excluded).  
Figure 3 presents this data for the three local government jurisdictions and the graph 
suggests a very different picture of growth in total imposts to what has characterised 
debates thus far. Specifically, the data derived from official Australian Bureau of 
Statistics reports, suggests that, on the whole, increases to total local government 
imposts are higher in NSW than for South Australia – certainly for the last 5 years. 
Indeed, it seems that growth in total impost over the last ten years have generally 
been much lower for business and households in South Australia than for the 
other two states. This evidence does run counter to some of the arguments used by 
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Figure 3. Total Revenue Annual Growth Rates less Grants and Subsidies, per 
assessment (percentage change) 
 
In order to get a sense of how a rate cap regime might affect South Australian local 
governments, it is important to first understand how much of the revenue flows to 
councils in the state are derived from rates. As detailed in Figure 4 below, South 
Australian local governments have far more reliance on rates for revenue than 
do their peers in NSW, and Victoria. What this means is that the deleterious 
consequences associated with rate cap regimes are likely to be felt more keenly by 
councils in South Australia than their peers on the East Coast – simply because South 
Australian councils have greater reliance on rates to fund the goods and services which 
they provide. Thus, it is critical to mitigate as many of the problems associated with rate 
capping as possible through careful design of the Bill and methodology (which we 
detail in succeeding pages of this report).  
Notably, Figure 5 suggests that South Australian reliance on rate revenue has been 
relatively stable over the last four years (the slight volatility in recent years is probably 
largely due to changes to the financial assistance grants). In the appendices we 
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Figure 4. Proportion of Revenue from Rates (per cent), 2016-17 
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2.2 Modelling of Fiscal Implications for South Australian 
Local Governments 
2.2.1 Uncertainties impacting on modelling 
It is no easy matter to model the potential implications arising from the introduction of a 
rate capping regime to South Australian local government because of (i) continued 
uncertainty regarding precisely how the cap would be calculated, (ii) difficulties 
accessing required data, and (iii) the potential for individual councils to apply for and 
receive a rate variation determination.  
2.2.1.1 Index calculation uncertainty 
In terms of methodological uncertainty ESCOSA’s address at the recent Special 
General Meeting on Rate Capping has left the door wide open regarding the index to 
be used and the potential for an efficiency dividend to be included into the ‘inflation 
factor’ – likely indexes seem to be the Adelaide Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the 
South Australian Local Government Price Index (LGPI), although neither fit the ideal 
attributes of a rate cap index (see Section 4).  
2.2.1.2 Data uncertainty 
There are also a number of changes that we strongly recommend, which if 
implemented would have a significant impact on the rate cap and our modelling. Data 
limitations mainly revolve around getting access to end of financial year number of 
assessments, and beginning of financial year number of properties (although if our 
recommendations are taken on board then this will not be the data actually used to 
calculated the cap – once again, see Section 4).  
2.2.1.3 Rate variation determination uncertainty 
In addition, there is significant uncertainty regarding the rate cap variation 
determination process, which councils might seek to gain a variation under the 
process, and the likelihood of requested variations being approved. In theory, no loss in 
potential rate revenue need occur at all if councils successfully apply for variations. 
However, in practice, councils tend not to apply for variation determinations due to the 
cost (both pecuniary and political) of doing so. 
2.2.2 Methodological approach 
The approach we have taken to get a feel for the potential pecuniary impact of a rate 
cap regime is to take the last three full financial years of data (the 2015, 2016, and 
2017 financial years) and compare actual general rate revenue to what would have 
been allowed under caps determined by various indexes. We conducted three separate 
modelling exercises, each model employing either the Adelaide CPI, South Australian 
LGPI, or a composite index (40% from the South Australian Wage Price Index (WPI) 
and 60% from the Adelaide CPI) which is the equivalent of the index currently used in 
Victoria. Notably rate caps in Victoria were originally derived from the Melbourne CPI, 
and rate caps in NSW employ the Local Government Cost Index which is broadly 
consistent with the LGPI.  
The models which we have generated reflect the compounding effect over the three 
years – what this means is that we assumed that councils in 2014/15 kept to the cap, 
which then formed the basis for the average rate revenue data for successive years. A 
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compounding model is more representative of how rate caps will evolve (potential lost 
revenue in one year is compounded into the next year’s cap) and provides a better feel 
for how the effects of rate capping are generally amplified over time. However, we do 
note that rate cap variation determinations may partially or completely mitigate ‘losses’ 
for a given council for one or more years. 
2.3 Modelling results 
2.3.1 Approximate index increases 
Table 3 provides details of the approximate increases yielded under each potential 
index for the three financial years of data that we modelled (in the actual modelling we 
used the precise index numbers which is an important thing to do to avoid material 
effects of rounding error given the large sums of money involved). As can be seen, 
there was a large reduction in the indices in 2015/16 and this alerts us to the fact that a 
rate cap based on any of these index inputs is subject to high volatility. Highly 
volatile revenue is a problem for local economies if it leads to high volatility in spending 
– however, if volatile revenues are not matched by spending volatility then this also 
presents a grave problem (reduced financial sustainability; Sacchi and Salotti, 2017; 
Tran et al. 2018). 
Table 3. Approximate Percentage Increase (exact indices used in model) 
 
Year 1  
2014/15 
Year 2  
2015/16 
Year 3  
2016/17 
LGPI 1.67% 0.95% 1.75% 
CPI 1.60% 0.82% 1.56% 
Composite (40% 
WPI, 60% CPI) 
1.98% 1.39% 1.81% 
2.3.2 Potential losses in taxation revenue 
Volatile indices when compounded result in an uneven magnitude of potential losses in 
taxation revenue over time. Figure 6 depicts the magnitude in potential revenue 
foregone for each of the three years that we modelled, for the entire state. Revenue 
potentially foregone for 2014/15 ranged from $62 million through to $67 million 
depending on the index used (the CPI index resulted in greatest potential loss, and the 
composite CPI WPI index on the least loss). In 2015/16 where indexes were at their 
lowest level (and where the effects of caps were compounded over one period) 
revenue foregone ranged from $99 million through to $111 million. In 2016/17 the 
compounded effects of two periods of caps, when combined with the indexes resulted 
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Figure 6. Potential Compounded Loss Under Different Rate Cap Indexes ($m), 
Entire State 
 
In Figures 7 and 8 we depict the split in potential compounded losses for regional and 
metropolitan councils (according to SAROC/GAROC classifications). 
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Figure 8. Potential Compounded Loss, Metropolitan Councils 
 
To provide a sense of what rate capping might mean for typical local government 
budgets we also expressed the compound potential revenue foregone as a proportion 
of total revenues accruing to councils over the three financial years (see Table 4). It is 
important to note that foregone revenue is dependent not only on the size of the index 
used for the cap, but also on the size of the increases to actual rate revenue for the 
three periods.  
As can be seen in the first part of Table 4 a rate cap would have material effects on 
total revenue for South Australian councils ranging from a reduction of 4.53 per 
cent (combined index in 2014/15) through to a reduction of 9.00 per cent (CPI in 
2016/17).  
2.3.3 Potential councils requiring rate variations 
As we have noted previously this potential revenue foregone need not be realised if 
councils were to successfully apply for a rate cap variation determination. Therefore, to 
provide a sense of how many councils would need to successfully apply for a rate cap 
variation determination in each period we made a count of councils which had a 
material decrease to revenue under the putative caps in each period (see figures in 
parentheses in each cell of Table 4). As can be seen, the far majority of councils 
would have needed to successfully apply for a variation determination in order to 
avoid significant reductions to revenue. Architects of the proposed rate cap clearly 
need to consider the capacity of councils and ESCOSA to prepare and process the 
large number of potential rate cap variation determinations suggested by our modelling.  
In the second part of Table 4 we re-present the data after applying an ‘efficiency 
dividend’. The proposed Bill allows for a reduction in the rate cap to account for a 
putative efficiency saving (although it is hard to imagine how the architects propose 
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be realised). In Victoria, ‘efficiency dividends’ of 0.05% have been employed in the last 
two recommendations (no efficiency dividend was imposed in the first 
recommendation) and we use this rate to model the effect of same were it to be applied 
in South Australia. On the whole, an efficiency dividend has a relatively small effect 
on potential revenue foregone (when compared to the effect of the volatility in indices 
or the compounding effect of successive caps). 
Table 4. Reduction in Taxation Revenue Under a Cap – Compounded Effect 
(number of councils which would have experienced a reduction in 
taxation revenue in parentheses). 
State - Average Reduction in Taxation Revenue Under Rate Cap 
Year 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 





















State with 'Efficiency Dividend'  - Average Reduction in Taxation Revenue 
Under Rate Cap 
Year 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 





















In Table 5 we split the potential revenue foregone by council type and thus 
demonstrate that the likely effect of a rate cap will be experienced differently by 
regional and metropolitan local governments respectively. In the next sub-section we 
briefly examine the implications of growth on capped general rates revenue. 
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Table 5. Potential Revenue Foregone, By Council Type. 
Regional  - Average Reduction in Taxation Revenue Under Rate Cap 
Year 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
WPI CPI combined index -4.16% -7.09% -8.31% 
CPI -4.52% -7.96% -9.39% 
LGPI -4.46% -7.78% -9.05% 
Metropolitan  - Average Reduction in Taxation Revenue Under Rate Cap 
Year 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
WPI CPI combined index -4.67% -6.86% -7.74% 
CPI -5.03% -7.73% -8.83% 
LGPI -4.96% -7.55% -8.48% 
2.4 Implications of Proposed Methodology for Councils 
Experiencing High Growth or Lumpy Growth 
In the Rate Cap Forum, Adam Wilson from ESCOSA provided further details on the 
methodology proposed to calculate the rate cap. The key elements of the algorithm 
are: 
Total Revenue
Number of Properties at the end of the year
*Index factor=Inflated rate figure 
 
Inflated rate figure* No. of properties at the start of the year=Total Revenue Outcome 
Based on details available to date (including S187D of the proposed Bill), two key 
algorithm inputs are: 
i. the number of properties at the end of the year (‘30 June in the base year’ in the 
Bill) and  
ii. the number of properties at the beginning of the year (‘1 July in the capped 
year’ in the Bill).  
One can’t but help question the wisdom of using number of properties data which is 
separated by just one day – it is hard to see what material benefit arises relative to the 
cost of collecting the data. Moreover, use of number of properties as at these specific 
dates results in high growth councils receiving a relatively lower rate cap (total 
revenue outcome) than might be warranted. 
Adam Wilson (2018; emphasis added) specifically states in his address to the Rate 
Cap Forum that councils need to ‘look at the end of the year, how many properties you 
had, assume they were there for all the year….’. The problem for growth councils, in 
particular, comes about because of the assumption that properties at the end of the 
year were rated at each of the four periods. This assumption will over-estimate the 
number of properties that received an assessment for the whole year. Because this 
figure is the denominator in the first part of the algorithm detailed above, the result is 
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that the average rate per property is consequently under-estimated. This in turn 
results in an under-estimate of the inflated rate figure which is then multiplied by the 
number of properties at the start of the year, to yield a total revenue outcome (that will 
also be an under-estimated as a result of the initial assumption).  
Clearly the more a council grows during a particular financial year, the more it will be 
disadvantaged, relative to lower growth peers, as a result of the (rather unreasonable) 
assumption that the number of properties at the end of the year were ‘there for all the 
year’. In addition, the timing of the growth is critical – that is, the disadvantage to 
growth councils will be felt most keenly when growth occurs towards the end of the 
year. 
There is no need to ‘model’ this problem for growth councils because it is a simple 
consequence of arithmetic operations. The solution is also relatively straight-forward – 
to use as the denominator the number of assessments issued throughout the year 
divided by four (to yield a weighted average number of properties). 
2.5 Modelling of Spread in Inter-jurisdictional Equity Over 
Time 
Earlier we noted that rate capping is known to give rise to reduced inter-jurisdictional 
equity over time. In 2015 Drew and Dollery calculated the revenue effort of all of the 
NSW local governments which can provide us with a good feel for the likely result of a 
long-term policy of rate capping. In simple terms, revenue effort is the quantum of local 
government imposts divided by the total incomes accruing to residents living in the 
local government area – it thus represents the typical proportional impost faced by 
ratepayers in a given local government area. Rates are calculated according to 
property values (a portion of stocks of wealth of individuals) but are paid out of flows of 
income irrespective of the method used for calculating the taxation (Ladd and Yinger, 
1989; Drew and Dollery, 2015).  
2.4.1 Inter-jurisdictional equity and rate capping 
A rate cap regime is designed to contain the imposts placed on flows of income, and 
this was the motivation cited by the Marshall government in its policy documents. 
However, a rate cap regime also tends to result in the emergence of great disparities in 
the revenue effort (and hence inter-jurisdictional equity) over time. For instance, in 
NSW Drew and Dollery (2015) reported revenue efforts that ranged from 0.209 per 
cent through to 2.497 per cent - over a ten-fold difference in the comparative proportion 
of income levied from residents in these two local government areas. Moreover, 
evidence of statistically significant differences in revenue effort was provided for the 
broad categories of agricultural, fringe, metropolitan, regional and remote local 
government areas – which suggests that the problem is associated with council type. 
There are a number of reasons why inter-jurisdictional inequity is a near certain 
consequence of rate capping. First, the cap is applied to the initial levels of rates that 
existed in the base year when the cap was implemented. This suggests that for inter-
jurisdictional equity to exist after the introduction of a state-wide cap (at least in the 
absence of sequent variation determinations), it is important to ensure that revenue 
efforts of the initial base year were more or less similar. Second, changes in the 
economy and demographics of a local government area over time give rise to relative 
changes to revenue effort. For instance, if a relatively deprived area attracts external or 
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internal migration from high income individuals this will change the denominator of the 
algorithm and hence result in an effective decrease in revenue effort. Otherwise stated 
if an area is ‘gentrified’, then the relative proportion of the income that recently arrived 
ratepayers pay towards local government imposts will become smaller. This can 
happen in reverse of course – an area can have a dramatic reduction in incomes as a 
result of a closure of a manufacturing plant, for example, and this will result in a relative 
increase to revenue effort. It might be noted that differences in capacity to pay should 
be addressed in the financial assistance grant allocations – but rarely are, due to 
problems with the federal legislation and methodologies (see Drew and Campbell, 
2016). Third, there is the compounding effect of a rate cap. Any time that the rate cap 
differs from the real value of money (inflation which is often measured by CPI), then the 
real value of the spread between imposts levied by different councils must vary. When 
this is compounded over many years the difference in imposts can be quite substantial. 
Moreover, because indexes typically exceed CPI (except if CPI is used of course) then 
the real value of the gap will widen each year (in the absence of variation 
determinations). 
2.4.2 Problems associated with inter-jurisdictional inequity 
Erosion of inter-jurisdictional equity is a problem because it is morally undesirable (it 
hardly seems fair that some residents in NSW pay more than ten times their proportion 
of income than do other residents in NSW largely as a result of their location 
decisions), and results in inefficient migration of capital and labour (Oates, 1999; Grant 
and Drew, 2017). Location and investment decisions should not be influenced by the 
occurrence of wildly inequitable taxation imposts. 
The solution to this problem comes in three-parts. First, it is important to provide 
councils with sufficient time and evidence (calculated revenue efforts for instance) to 
adjust taxation levels in consultation with their communities. This would require a delay 
of the Bill for at least one full rating cycle and is particularly important for rural councils 
which often adjust rates to suit agricultural conditions in any given year. Second, the 
Bill should require ESCOSA and the Minister to give due regard to revenue effort when 
recommending and declaring the cap, or when assessing applications for rate cap 
variation determinations (see Section 5). Third, a revenue effort metric should be 
included as part of a comprehensive performance monitoring suite required to support 
the introduction of rate capping.  
We now turn to a consideration of the implications arising from rate capping that might 
reasonably be expected by residents and businesses in South Australia. 
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3. Implications for Residents and 
Business in South Australia 
If a rate cap is set to reflect the actual increase in costs faced by specific classes of 
councils then deleterious side-effects for local government residents and businesses 
will be minimised (although side-effects may still be significant). Local government in 
South Australia has been working hard on sustainability over recent years and there is 
thus little scope to generate additional true efficiencies (see Section 4). Therefore, in a 
carefully constructed rate cap regime, which uses tailored indexes that reflect actual 
increases to costs faced by councils, the most likely consequences for residents and 
businesses will be one or more of the following:  
(i) inability of council to respond effectively to changes in community need (no 
capacity to increase goods and services or the quality of existing goods and 
services provided),  
(ii) limited capacity of council to respond to changes in community need funded 
through additional debt or a reduction in other goods or services (or 
subsidies for vulnerable community members),  
(iii) some council ability to respond to changes in community need funded 
through delays in provision of infrastructure or reduced maintenance of 
infrastructure, or  
(iv) council ability to respond to changes in community need funded through 
rate cap variation determinations.  
3.1 Likely consequences of rate capping for ratepayers 
The extant scholarly evidence suggests that the second and third consequences of a 
rate cap regime are the most likely to occur (see Drew and Dollery 2015; 2016). Both 
options effectively transfer the cost of goods and services consumed in the 
present to future generations of local government taxpayers. This is clearly 
undesirable on moral grounds, but also presents a significant risk to long term financial 
sustainability. If the forty year experiment in NSW has taught us anything it is that the 
most deleterious consequences from rate capping tend to take time to manifest fully, 
but inevitably do so (see also the compounded effect of rate capping modelled in 
Section 2). 
3.1.1 Possible initial period of reduced quantity and quality of goods 
However, if the rate cap is set for the entire state and employs an unsuitable index 
which does not capture the actual changes in costs faced by different classes of 
councils then the consequences for residents and businesses will be considerably 
more severe. Councils may well be forced to reduce the quantity and quality of 
goods and services if the cap does not keep up with changes to the cost of 
provision (even in the absence of changes to community need). Infrastructure 
backlogs may grow and maintenance will be reduced. Additional debt may be taken on 
and financial sustainability must ultimately falter (in the absence of successful rate cap 
variation determinations or rather unlikely gains in efficiency). Side-effects will be 
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relatively more pronounced and become significant much earlier – unless there are 
frequent successful rate cap variation determination applications by most councils. 
Moreover, councils outside of the Greater Capital City area will feel the effects much 
more keenly than their city peers, because of relatively fewer opportunities to generate 
own-source revenue, few options for outsourcing, and more discordance between the 
geographical association of most indexes (that is, many indexes such as CPI are 
produced solely from capital city data and other indexes produced on a state-wide or 
national basis are heavily biased towards measurements taken in capital cities). 
3.1.2 Possible rate shock 
Indeed, it is important to note that rate cap variations, whilst having the potential to 
address revenue shortages for councils, also have the potential to create rate shock 
for residents and businesses. This is because rate cap variation determinations tend to 
be done infrequently (as a consequence of high political and pecuniary costs) and thus 
represent an attempt to catch-up on insufficient revenue suffered over many years in 
relatively short periods (of up to five years). For example, if a given council experienced 
a need to generate an additional 0.1% per annum in revenue over a number of years it 
is unlikely that the council would apply for, and be granted, a rate variation 
determination in each and every year. What is far more likely is that the council would 
initially absorb the cost (through debt, reduced reserves, or reduced infrastructure 
spending) for five years or more and then apply for an increase for the compounded 
value of the rate revenue shortfall. That has been the experience in NSW – councils 
typically go a decade or more before applying for a special rate variation to address 
shortfalls.  
What this generally means for residents and businesses is: 
(i) an initial period of reduced quantity and quality of goods whilst council first 
seeks to absorb the shortfall (for example poorer road maintenance over this 
period), followed by  
(ii) a rate shock, whereby the compounded value of the rate shortfall, accrued 
over a number of years, is applied to local government ratepayers all at once.  
3.2 Additional considerations 
3.2.1 Misconceptions for individual rating assessments 
Moreover, this is not the only rate shock that may befall ratepayers operating under a 
rate cap regime. A commonly cited problem with rate capping is that it does not 
necessarily lead to caps on individual assessments. For instance, changes to 
zoning, or relative changes in property valuations can result in individual assessments 
increasing by more than the cap, even in a council where no rate cap variation is in 
place. Therefore, it is critical that ratepayers are educated about what a rate cap 
means for individual assessments, and moreover, that rate cap declarations are 
worded carefully so as to avoid misconceptions that may give rise to ratepayer angst. 
3.2.2 No guarantee to reduce growth in imposts 
It is also the case that rate capping can give rise to annual increases that exceed 
those that might have occurred in the absence of a rate cap regime in some 
cases. For instance, if our recommendation to amend the Bill to provide for a catch-up 
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provision is not taken on board then councils would be unlikely to increase rates by 
anything less than the cap because doing so would effectively forego future 
compounded revenue. A rate cap regime that does not have a catch-up provision will 
also significantly reduce the likelihood that councils might reduce imposts in response 
to local economic shocks, because doing so would have significant repercussions for 
future taxation take. Reduced flexibility of this kind will cause local government 
taxpayers to experience relatively greater financial stress at times when the local 
economy has experienced a shock.  
Indeed, as our analysis of total own-source revenue growth (Figure 3 in Section 2) 
demonstrates there is every chance that a rate cap regime may not reduce growth in 
imposts at all for many residents and businesses in South Australia.  
3.2.3 Promotion of fiscal illusion 
One of the biggest and most neglected problems for ratepayers operating under a rate 
cap regime is that it tends to promote fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion, in this context, 
refers to the situation whereby ratepayers find it difficult to accurately ascribe value to 
public goods and services because there is a disconnect between the quality and 
quantity provided, on the one hand, and the taxes paid to fund the goods and services, 
on the other. It results in inefficient levels of demand which clearly erodes financial 
sustainability, but also has an ultimate effect on ratepayer’s wallets when the inevitable 
reckoning arrives (generally a rate cap variation determination that will cause some 
rate shock). At this time of reckoning residents may feel aggrieved that fiscal illusion 
caused them to arrive at their predicament – essentially at this point residents will be 
asked to pay a bill for goods and services consumed, that they might have incorrectly 
assumed had been paid for in full already.  
3.2.4 Disproportionately high impact on vulnerable resident populations 
A rate cap regime may also have significant implications for the most vulnerable 
residents in a local government area. Specifically, if the rate cap index does not 
faithfully represent actual increases in costs faced by specific classes of councils, or an 
efficiency dividend is imposed which does not actually represent the potential for true 
efficiencies, then so-called discretionary services and subsidies may be reduced by 
councils facing financial pressures. For instance, subsidies for merit goods (things like 
swimming pool admissions) may be frozen and thus decrease in real value. Community 
projects – including those delivered in part through grants provided by individual local 
governments to community groups – to support vulnerable persons (for example 
support for the homeless) might not be able to be renewed. These potential outcomes 
need not necessarily come about (for instance the council could successfully apply for 
a rate cap variation determination), however it is not unreasonable to suggest that 
some vulnerable people in some local government areas are likely to bear some 
of the ill side-effects of a poorly designed or executed rate cap regime (which is why 
it is so important to adopt our recommended amendments to the Bill and methodology).  
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4. A Critique of the Proposed 
Methodology 
Unfortunately, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, full detail of the methodology had 
still not been articulated by ESCOSA or included in the draft Bill at the time that we 
were commissioned to work on this Report. The following critique of the methodology is 
based on the available information as at the 9th August and largely draws on the 
proposed Bill and the address by Adam Wilson from ESCOSA at the Local 
Government Association Special General Meeting on Rate Capping.  
Ideally, the methodology and index to be used should be clearly specified in the Bill or 
associated Regulations. Failure to specify the methodology makes it very difficult 
for the sector to fully engage in the debate and contribute to the consultation 
process. It also effectively requires political decision makers to make judgements 
based on incomplete knowledge. In addition, failure to specify methodology in the 
legislation allows the independent and politically unaccountable ESCOSA 
extraordinary discretionary powers to shape a policy that will have very significant 
effects on the local government sector. 
4.1 Index factor considerations 
4.1.1 Undue emphasis on minimising index cost 
The thing that stands out more than any other matter in relation to the details on the 
methodology for setting a rate cap in South Australia, that we have gleaned thus far, is 
the emphasis on ensuring that costs are minimised – particularly for ESCOSA. 
Indeed, at the recent Forum on Rate Capping, Adam Wilson from ESCOSA outlined 
the focus of ‘keeping it simple, keeping it cost effective’ and noted that a desirable 
index ‘should not be costly to produce and administer’.  
It is hard to reconcile the strong focus on a cheap methodology (including a cheap 
index) with the large sums of money involved in a rate cap regime (see Section 2 that 
outlines a potential revenue foregone of up to $133 million per annum), and the large 
expense associated with using an inappropriate index and methodology (the expense 
of preparing and assessing high numbers of rate cap variation determinations, or the 
expense of a council becoming insolvent – see, Drew and Campbell, 2015). Indeed, ‘to 
buy cheap methodology is to buy dear in the longer term’ (Bird et al. 2005). 
Using appropriate indexes and methodology that respond to the different 
circumstances of the various classes of councils, will result in less confusion from the 
public (see Section 1), will reduce the number of rate cap variation determination 
applications, and will ensure that the sector remains sustainable in the long term. The 
only reason for not using appropriate indexes and methodology is a reticence to spend 
the time and money required to produce same.  
4.1.2 Desirable characteristics of an index 
In the Special General Meeting address Adam Wilson from ESCOSA nominated the 
following as being desirable characteristics for an index factor: 
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• Understood and accepted by all stakeholders 
• Reliable and independent 
• Transparent 
• Simple 
• Not costly to produce and administer. 
4.1.2.1 Accepted, Understandable, Reliable 
It is unlikely that all stakeholders will ever agree to accept a given index factor. 
Whether or not the stakeholders understand the index factors is largely dependent on 
how much information is conveyed to stakeholders (very little so far). We agree that the 
index must be reliable and not subject to undue manipulation and would argue that it is 
important for all parties to understand what exactly ‘reliability’ means. Indeed, we 
consider that a reliable index is one that minimises the need for rate cap variation 
determinations and minimises the risk of local government financial failure.  
4.1.2.2 Transparency 
We also agree that the indexes should be transparent. However, we disagree with the 
contention that a reliable and appropriate index could ever be simple and believe that 
there is a large trade-off between simplicity and reliability which could put the sector at 
considerable risk if a quest for simplicity was allowed to displace more important 
desirable characteristics. We also disagree with the objective of having a cheap index 
and methodology – if this focus continues to be given primacy then it is very likely that 
it will prove extremely expensive in the long run.  
4.1.3 Appropriateness of index construction 
4.1.3.1 State-wide index 
ESCOSA has stated a preference for a state-wide index. This would certainly be 
cheaper and simpler for ESCOSA. However, there is a host of econometric evidence in 
the Australia corpus of scholarly literature that demonstrates distinct classes of local 
governments that have distinct expenditure profiles and revenue need (see, for 
example, Drew et al. 2016; Drew and Dollery, 2014). Indeed, the federal government 
Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities uses a 22 category 
system to classify local government. Moreover, the empirical methodology for 
establishing an accurate classification of local governments has been demonstrated in 
the scholarly literature (see, Drew and Dollery, 2016b). There is simply no reasonable 
justification for advocating for a state-wide cap.  
4.1.3.2 Tailored indexes 
At the very least, tailored indexes should be designed for urban, rural, regional (large 
towns outside of the capital city that act as a hub for outlying smaller rural centres), and 
fringe/growth classes of local governments. These classes have different expenditure 
mixes (for instance urban councils spend relatively more on materials and contracts 
and less on staff than do their rural peers), different opportunities to contain costs (it is 
rarely possible to outsource to private contractors in rural areas, and due in part to 
distance constraints most shared service arrangements may not yield efficiencies in 
rural areas), and different expenditure needs (for instance, growth councils often have 
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great demands placed on them to build infrastructure and expand capacity). So at 
least four indexes would seem to be required. 
4.1.3.3 Alternative indexes 
This still leaves the question open as to what would be an appropriate basis for an 
index. A number of ready-made alternatives have been proposed including the South 
Australian Local Government Price Index, and the Adelaide Consumer Price Index.  
In Victoria a composite index (40% of the Victorian Wage Price Index and 60% of the 
Melbourne Consumer Price Index) is employed. None of these ready-made solutions 
will provide a reliable and appropriately tailored index. A key policy question that must 
be asked (and defined in the objectives of the proposed Bill) is – what is the main 
purpose of the rate cap? If the purpose is to ensure that ratepayers are not exposed to 
undue cost of living pressures with the requirement that the local government sector 
remains sustainable (as we suggest in Section 5), then an appropriate index would be 
one that measured the change in the cost of a basket of actual local government inputs 
(materials and labour) for each broad class of council from one year to another. This 
requires that a sample of costs is taken each year for each class of council.  
The LGPI is fit for the purpose for which it was designed, but is not fit for the purpose of 
being used as an index for rate cap purposes. It appears to apply a single index to all 
South Australian councils rather than specific classes of councils (this could be 
changed though). It also uses existing ready-made indexes as key inputs – specifically, 
‘select ABS price indexes (i.e. select Consumer Price Indexes and Producer Price 
Indexes [PPI] for Adelaide and Australia’ (emphasis added; South Australian Centre for 
Economic Studies, 2018). Moreover, the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies 
(2018) rightly cautions that ‘it is important to note that the ABS price indexes used in 
the model are estimates, based on a sample of goods and services from a sample of 
retailers, wholesalers and employing organisations….therefore the Local Government 
Price Indexes which are calculated using ABS price indexes are also estimates’.  
We would add the additional caution that the CPI is far from transparent and has been 
criticised in relation to this flaw many times in the scholarly literature – nor are the items 
in the basket of goods likely to be sufficiently representative of the items that local 
government purchase, because the CPI is designed to reflect household spending. In 
addition, the CPI is disaggregated only to the level of capital cities and therefore may 
bear little resemblance to increases in household expenditure in rural, regional or fringe 
areas.  
In sum, because the LGPI employs a capital city CPI and a national PPI it is hard to 
see how it has much relevance to the required task of measuring the increase to costs 
faced by classes of local government in South Australia. However, if actual 
measurements were taken on a basket of goods that all stakeholders agreed local 
government does purchase (which must include employee wages), and the 
measurements were taken for each of the different classes of councils, and the price 
rise in this basket of goods consumed by local government was to replace ready-made 
CPI and PPI indexes then the LGPI would become fit for the purpose of recommending 
a rate cap.  
Of course assembling tailored and reliable indexes would cost money and take time 
(which is why ESCOSA doesn’t currently propose to do so), however the alternative is 
that the rate cap won’t reflect the costs faced by most councils (certainly councils 
outside of the capital city), will therefore cause confusion among the public about what 
represents an ‘undue cost of living increase’, will result in more rate cap variation 
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determination applications (most notably from non-capital city local governments), and 
could ultimately result in one or more local governments becoming insolvent. Truly, to 
buy cheap now would seem to be to buy very dear in the long-run. 
We have already explained why the CPI is unsuitable (although we might add that 
another problem with potentially using the CPI as the index is that the RBA has 
recently reduced its forecast, yet again, for inflation to just 1.75% – a rate well below 
it’s target band – which reflects the RBA’s apparent inability to address sluggish growth 
in inflation; ABC, 2018). The Victorian alternative is to use a composite index of 40% 
Victorian Wage Price Index and 60% of the Melbourne CPI). This is certainly better 
than CPI alone, but still contains this unsuitable index as the main input. Moreover, the 
state Wage Price Index reflects both private and all public sector wages, and hence 
does not reflect local government wage price increases (it would seem relatively easy 
to simply use the South Australian Municipal Salaried Officers Award instead of a, 
mostly irrelevant, Wage Price Index).  
4.2 Other Methodological Matters 
There are a number of other methodological issues that should ideally be addressed 
prior to the establishment of a rate cap regime. In particular, changes need to be made 
to: 
• accommodate high growth councils;  
• preserve a reasonable level of interjurisdictional equity and pay due regard to 
capacity to pay;  
• ensure that councils have the flexibility to tailor imposts to local economic 
conditions;  
• discourage councils from applying the maximum cap as a default option; 
• ensure transparency independence and political accountability in the rate cap 
setting process; and  
• ensure that any efficiency dividend imposed actually reflects gains in efficiency 
rather than cuts to service levels or service quality.  
4.2.1 Accommodate high growth councils 
We have already briefly outlined why it is problematic for the methodology to assume 
that the number of properties at the end of the year have been the subject of rates 
assessments for the entire year. It is a simple outcome of the mathematical operations 
involved in calculating the capped revenue that this assumption will result in councils 
with high growth (and especially councils which experience ‘lumpy’ growth 
orientated towards the end of the year) being relatively disadvantaged. The 
solution is also relatively straight-forward – to use the actual number of assessments 
issued, divided by four which yields an average weighted number of properties.  
4.2.2 Address potential drift in interjurisdictional equity 
Similarly the inevitable drift in interjurisdictional equity over time is also a problem 
which has a ready solution, although in this case the solution is a three part remedy.  
First, councils must be given sufficient time and support to establish rates of 
taxation that reflect inter-jurisdictional equity in consultation with communities. 
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Time must be allowed for local governments to negotiate with their communities the 
quantity and quality of services that they are willing to pay for. This is particularly 
important for councils which might have deferred increases to imposts in recent years 
owing to local economic shocks (such as poor agricultural or manufacturing 
conditions).  
Second, the Bill should require ESCOSA to pay regard to inter-jurisdictional equity 
when formulating its recommendation and for the Minister to pay due regard to 
inter-jurisdictional equity when declaring the rate cap (see below for a full 
explanation regarding why ESCOSA’s role should be restricted to recommendations to 
a politically accountable Minister). The Bill should also direct ESCOSA and the Minister 
to pay reasonable regard to revenue effort (and the related concepts of 
interjurisdictional equity and capacity to pay) when assessing rate cap variation 
determination applications.  
Third, a revenue effort metric (and ideally also a number of demographic metrics) 
should be included as essential elements of a performance monitoring suite which 
must be developed to support the rate cap regime. A carefully designed performance 
monitoring suite will also provide councils with the evidence and support they need to 
monitor their sustainability, will provide ESCOSA and councils with an evidence base to 
support rate cap variation determinations, will allow the ESCOSA and the Minister to 
monitor the effect of the rate cap on local government sustainability and equity, and will 
increase transparency and educate members of the public about the challenges facing 
local government (which is particularly important to mitigate the political costs 
associated with a council pursuing a rate cap variation). Indeed, a suitable performance 
monitoring regime would perform a critical early warning function and should 
automatically trigger a rate cap variation application if certain metrics deteriorate (which 
would further reduce political costs). 
4.2.3 Facilitate responsiveness to local economic shocks and conditions 
It is critical that councils maintain some flexibility under a rate cap regime to allow 
them to respond to local economic shocks and reduce the incentive to view the 
rate cap as a default option. As we have noted many councils respond to local 
economic shocks by deferring increases to imposts or even reducing imposts. 
Moreover, a common unanticipated and deleterious outcome associated with rate cap 
regimes is that councils tend to increase rates by the maximum cap each period – even 
if circumstances do not strictly warrant doing so – for fear of missing out on future 
compounded revenues (or having to spend considerable time and money pursuing an 
expensive rate cap variation determination).  
The simple solution to both of these problems is to legislate for a catch-up provision 
(see Drew and Dollery, 2015). That is, should a council not increase the general rate by 
the maximum cap amount (or indeed if a council chooses to reduce taxation imposts in 
response to a local economic shock), in a given year then in future years the council 
will have the opportunity to make additional increases that would capture the 
compounded effects of revenue foregone in earlier periods, without the need to apply 
for a variation. 
 
 Rate Capping in South Australia  40 
4.2.4 Independent and transparent process 
4.2.4.1 Independent recommendations can mitigate political influences 
It is also important that the rate cap process is completely transparent and has an 
element of political accountability designed into it. Councillor Linda Scott, from Local 
Government New South Wales, who spoke at the Special General Meeting on Rate 
Capping stated that local government in NSW had campaigned hard to have rate 
capping removed from the Minister and handed over to an independent regulator. 
Presumably prior to rate capping being regulated solely by the Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Authority (IPART) political considerations had been perceived to unduly 
influence decision making and lead to cap declarations that were lower than desired.  
4.2.4.2 Independent regulators suffer from accountability deficiency 
However, having an independent regulator with no political accountability also presents 
some serious problems. For instance, there is a very large literature on regulatory 
capture which describes the situation whereby a regulator, over time, tends to pursue 
the interests of the party that they are charged with regulating rather than the public 
interest. In addition, if the independent regulator sets inappropriate caps then there is 
little that can be done to redress an unsatisfactory situation. Indeed, there have been 
some very strident criticisms of IPART over a number of years (for instance, see 
TCorp, 2013).  
Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the fact that the very body that has been setting the 
rate caps in NSW for many years (IPART) was the major body involved with assessing 
that 60 per cent of councils weren’t fit for the future – this seems to suggest that the 
rate cap has not been set in a fashion which preserves financial sustainability and 
implicitly poses questions from IPART (as an assessor of financial sustainability) 
regarding IPART’s performance as a rate cap regulator. However, the main problem is 
that there is no political accountability – which undermines the whole purpose of having 
democratically elected representatives (Hood, 2011). 
4.2.4.3 Achieving independent and accountable determinations 
We believe that a rate cap regime can have the best of both worlds – an independent 
evidence-based recommendation and political accountability. It is not an ‘either or’ 
proposition.  
ESCOSA should be charged in the Bill with providing an evidence-based 
recommendation and fully detailing how it arrived at the recommendation for the 
purposes of transparency and confidence in the regime by stakeholders. Political 
accountability would come into play by requiring in the Bill, that the Minister must 
declare the rate cap with reference to the recommendation and fully detail the 
Minister’s reasoning should the Minister make a declaration which is not consistent 
with the ESCOSA recommendation.  
Otherwise stated, if the Minister concurred with ESCOSA then the Minister would 
simply need to state that the declaration was in line with the recommendation. 
However, if the Minister declared a rate cap inconsistent with the recommendation then 
the Minister should be required by the Bill to fully specify the Minister’s reasons and 
evidence for doing so. Under this arrangement it would be critical for ESCOSA to 
provide a single recommendation for each of the classes of local government, rather 
than a range of recommendations, to ensure that the Minister was fully accountable. 
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4.2.5 Appropriateness of an efficiency dividend provision 
Related to transparency and accountability for recommending and declaring a rate cap 
is the need to be transparent, accountable and clear about the reasons for factoring in 
an efficiency dividend, if this course of action is chosen. Indeed, the proposed Bill does 
not define efficiency and this oversight must be addressed to avoid reductions in 
service quantity or quality being imposed onto residents. It is completely contrary to the 
democratic tradition for a council to have the service quantity and quality that they have 
negotiated with the community reduced by an efficiency dividend that is unrealistic and 
therefore not reflective of efficiency at all.  
The economic definition of input orientated technical efficiency is the potential reduction 
of inputs that could be realised whilst holding the quantity and quality of outputs 
constant (see Drew et al., 2015). Only a reduction in the required inputs will result in 
‘efficiency dividends’ that are in fact genuine artefacts of efficiency rather than cost 
cutting exercises imposed by higher tiers of government, or indeed a politically 
unaccountable independent regulator. Indeed, wage and material prices are largely 
outside of the control of local governments and efficiency is therefore hard to realise in 
practise.  
One way to capture efficiencies is to increase productivity, but this is a little unrealistic 
in view of national trends. Another is to outsource functions to private enterprises but 
this may not be possible in many rural areas, and even when it is possible it often 
exposes local governments to high levels of future price risk (Brown and Potoski, 
2003). Another option is shared services, but these arrangements must be very 
carefully executed to ensure that efficiency (rather than inefficiency) results and this 
becomes a very difficult task in rural areas where local governments are separated by 
vast distances.  
In sum, the potential for true efficiencies to be generated in local government is very 
remote and is certainly determined by the environment (for example, rural or urban) 
that a council operates in. It is critical that the Bill defines efficiency carefully and 
requires ESCOSA and the Minister to produce evidence to support their reasoning 
should an efficiency dividend be sought. Failure to do otherwise will undermine the 
democratic process and result in communities forcibly having their service levels 
reduced below their negotiated positions. 
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5. Desirable Amendments to the 
Bill 
Our discussion of rate capping, and the specific rate cap policy proposed for South 
Australia has led us to the point where we can now make some specific 
recommendations for changes to the proposed Bill that will serve to maximise benefits 
arising from a rate cap regime and minimise the likely deleterious consequences of 
same. It might be noted that one of the key recommendations from our critique is 
for the independent regulator to make a recommendation that must be 
considered by the Minister in declaring a rate cap – this is important to ensure 
continued political accountability for the outcomes of setting local government taxation.  
The following recommendations for changes to the Bill (see Table 6) assume that this 
key recommendation will be adopted.  
Table 6. Suggested Changes to the Proposed Rate Cap Bill 
Section Proposed Change Reason 
187C 
To ensure: 
a) That ratepayers are not 
exposed to undue cost of 
living pressures with respect 
to local government taxation 
b) That council financial 
sustainability is maintained 
Suggestion for (a) responds to 
the motivation of the rate cap 
policy. Sub-section (b) ensures 
that due consideration is given 
to the financial sustainability of 
councils. 
S187D(2) 
‘N’ needs to be defined as number 
of quarterly assessments issued 
divided by four 
This will yield a weighted 
average number of properties. 
The previous definition 
assumes all properties at the 
end of the year paid rates for 
all four quarters. This 
underestimates the average 
rate per property, with is then 
inflated and used to produce 
the cap. Thus, unless the 
change is made high growth 
councils will be penalised 
(especially if growth is lumpy 
and occurs towards the end of 
the financial year). 
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S187 (4) 
An additional clause needs to be 
inserted: ‘should a council not 
increase the general rate by the 
maximum amount, CSR, in a given 
year then in future years the council 
will have the opportunity to make 
additional increases (above the cap 
determined for the year) that will 
capture the compounded effects of 
revenue foregone in earlier periods, 
without the need to apply for a 
variation determination’ 
Without a catch-up provision 
the evidence is clear that most 
councils will increase their 
rates by the maximum cap. 
This may produce outcomes 
contrary to the Bill’s intent. In 
addition, a catch-up provision 
is essential to allow councils to 
have the flexibility to time 
increases to imposts to the 
local economic conditions 
(especially important for rural 
councils). 
S187E(2) 
Delete ‘(a) councils generally’. 
There is no empirical or theoretical 
justification for a single state-wide 
cap. 
A single state-wide cap is more 
likely to result in erosion to 
financial sustainability and will 
certainly increase the need for 
rate cap variation 
determination applications 
(and hence additional expense 
for both councils and 
ESCOSA). In addition, rate 
caps tailored to classes of 
councils are far less likely to 
contribute to misconceptions 
by ratepayers. 
S187E(3)(a) 
The index that forms the basis for 
the cap should be specified here. If 
this is not possible then the 
characteristics of an appropriate 
index should be listed to ensure that 
inappropriate indexes are not 
employed. That is, any index 
employed must be transparent, and 
respond to the objectives of the Bill. 
ESCOSA must be directed to 
produce a report that details 
precisely how the index was 
produced for each class of council. 
Cost and simplicity have been 
outlined by ESCOSA as their 
main consideration. This focus 
risks the financial sustainability 
of councils and the 
sustainability of the rate cap 
regime. If the objective of the 
Bill is to reduce undue cost of 
living pressures, whilst 
maintaining a financially 
sustainable system then any 
index must reflect the unit 
costs actually faced by classes 
of councils. The LGPI is not 
suitable for this purpose. 
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S187(3)(b) 
The term ‘efficiency’ must be 
defined carefully to ensure that 
there is no confusion with respect to 
the various kinds of efficiency 
recognised by economists 
(allocative, technical and dynamic), 
and that it is not used in a vague 
cost-reduction sense (which will 
result in a reduction in the quantity 
and quality of services). The 
accepted definition of input-
orientated technical efficiency is the 
reduction in the inputs used to 
provide a given quantity and quality 
of outputs. 
There is far too much latitude 
in the current Bill for a non-
politically accountable body 
(ESCOSA) to recommend a 
reduction in the quantity and 
quality of local government 
goods (which may well have its 
greatest effect on the most 
vulnerable in the community). 
Careful definition of input-
orientated technical efficiency 
will reduce the likelihood of 
forced changes to local 
government goods and service 
which would represent a risk to 
the democratic foundations of 
local government. 
S187E(3) 
Clauses should be added to direct 
ESCOSA to pay reasonable regard 
to four critical considerations to a 
sustainable rate cap: 
i. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in revenue 
capacity 
ii. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in local 
government financial 
sustainability 
iii. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in inter-
jurisdictional equity 
iv. How the rate cap responds 
to service sufficiency 
It is well documented that rate 
capping tends to break the 
nexus with capacity to pay, 
erodes financial sustainability 
and reduces inter-jurisdictional 
equity. Requiring the ESCOSA 
to specifically consider these 
aspects when formulating its 
recommendation to the 
Minister will reduce the 
likelihood of these deleterious 
side-effects. 
S387E(3) 
Needs to include a clause ‘give 
councils, local government peak 
bodies, and local government 
regulatory bodies the opportunity to 
make public submissions on the 
size of the cap, and the 
appropriateness of an efficiency 
dividend to which ESCOSA must 
pay reasonable regard to in the 
formulation of its rate cap 
recommendation’. 
For a transparent, effective 
and sustainable rate capping 
regime it is critical that key 
stakeholders be provided with 
the opportunity to make public 
submissions to ESCOSA, and 
that due regard is paid to 
same. 
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S187E 
(new) 
Add at an appropriate place: ‘The 
Minister must publish the Ministerial 
rate cap determination and in doing 
so make specific reference to the 
ESCOSA recommendation and 
detail reasons for differing to same, 
should the determination not accord 
with the recommendation.’ 
This clause is essential to 
ensure that a move to rate 
capping in South Australia 
does not result in political 
accountability being eschewed 
entirely. Notably the alteration 
would require the Minister to 
make specific reference to the 
recommendation and detail 
reasons for differing to the 
recommendation should this 
be the case. The 
recommended clause ensures 
both independence and 
political accountability. 
S187E(6) ‘or negative’ must be deleted 
A decrease to local 
government unit cost is 
extremely unlikely and 
therefore does not need to be 
accommodated in the Bill. 
Indeed, allowing for a negative 
rate cap represents a large risk 
that reductions in service 
quantity and quality will be 
forced onto councils. 
S187F(2) 
Must include the same 
considerations as outlined for 
ESCOSA’s rate cap 
recommendation: 
i. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in revenue 
capacity 
ii. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in local 
government financial 
sustainability 
iii. How the rate cap responds 
to changes in inter-
jurisdictional equity 
iv. How the rate cap responds 
to service sufficiency 
To minimise the chances of 
deleterious outcomes arising 
from rate capping. 
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S187F(4) ‘or negative’ should be struck 
For the same reasons 
articulated earlier. Moreover, it 
is hardly likely that a council 
would apply for a negative rate 
cap variation determination, so 
leaving this clause in might 
suggest that councils could be 
‘punished’ for making an 
application for an increase to 
the cap (with a decrease being 
declared instead) 
S187K(1)(c) 
ESCOSA should be directed to have 
specific regard to: 
• Effects on revenue 
capacity 
• Effects on service 
sufficiency 
• Effects on inter-
jurisdictional equity 
 
These matters were noted to 
be critical inclusions for earlier 
sections of the Bill (financial 
sustainability was already 
included in 187K(1)(b)). 
 
9-Review 
The review should be due by the 31 
December 2021. The Bill should 
require that the report be prepared 
by an independent entity with 
appropriate qualifications (not by 
ESCOSA) to ensure no 
apprehension of bias. 
This will ensure that the 
Parliament which is 
responsible for the legislation 
is given the opportunity to 
review it. This is important for 
both political accountability and 
for the thoroughness of the 
review. 
It is critical that the report is 
prepared by an entity which all 
stakeholders recognise to be 
appropriately qualified and 
completely independent. 
Consideration should also be given to setting out in the Bill the matters which must be 
detailed in any public release of rate cap recommendations or rate cap determinations. 
At a minimum this should include statements to the effect that the rate cap is a guide 
to ‘the maximum increase to general rates that should be made by typical 
councils which do not face acute financial sustainability challenges, significant 
infrastructure backlogs, or significant unmet community need’.  
It should also be clearly stated that ‘individual assessments might increase at a rate 
above the cap owing to relative changes in valuations, zoning or rate cap 
variation determinations’. It also should be stated that ‘prudent financial 
management requires councils with acute sustainability challenges, significant 
infrastructure backlogs, or significant unmet community need, to consult with 
their communities and apply for a special rate variation’. 
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6. Preparing for a Rate Cap 
Regime 
There is a lot of preparation work to be done by councils prior to the implementation of 
a rate cap regime – which is why we strongly recommend delaying the 
commencement of any regime for at least a full rating cycle. The decision to 
implement a rate cap regime is ultimately a political judgement, which lies somewhat 
outside of the control of local government representatives. Therefore, councils would 
be prudent to start preparing now as a hedge against the risk that a regime will be 
implemented – most of the work will have considerable value for long-term financial 
sustainability even if the proposed Bill is not passed. 
The most urgent and critical task – as we have noted a few times – is to ensure that 
existing rating practices: 
• meet the sustainability needs of council;  
• reflect service level agreements negotiated with the community; and  
• reflect willingness to pay.  
Existing community consultation practices and long-term financial plans should ideally 
be re-visited with a view to seeing how they would stand up to the constraints of a rate 
cap regime were it to be implemented. Otherwise stated, were constraints to be 
introduced to rate revenue (that may not completely reflect increases to costs actually 
faced by Council):  
• how would the community like Council to react?  
• Is the community prepared to accept cost-cutting responses – less services, 
lower quality services, less frequent maintenance of infrastructure?  
• Or would the community be prepared to countenance a rate cap variation 
determination at the earliest opportunity (and what would they expect for the 
additional impost)?  
• Perhaps the community would be prepared to accrue debt?  
Moreover, it is important to discover whether the community would still consider it 
appropriate to pursue new planned services or infrastructure projects were a rate cap 
introduced. Part of the process of preparing for the introduction of a rate cap regime will 
also involve a careful re-assessment of asset maintenance and depreciation 
schedules, that responds to guidance which the community provides to Council on 
how it wishes to respond to a rate cap regime. In short, a rate cap is an entirely new 
paradigm that probably wasn’t given great weight during earlier community 
consultations, and therefore requires a complete re-appraisal of matters.  
One important ingredient to successfully navigating the advent of a rate cap regime is 
community education. It is important for every council to communicate clearly with 
the community about where their local government taxation goes, the size of the 
subsidies provided by council (and justification for same), the purpose of 
reserves (which is often misconceived by residents), and how future needs are 
being planned for. Our experience with local government, over many years, have 
uncovered some excellent examples of communication with residents.  
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One particularly good technique is to provide the information in graphical form with 
rates assessment notices – this is the point at which the taxpayer is cognitively 
engaged on the matter and thus an ideal opportunity to convey important information. 
Other councils regularly conduct small random samples of their ratepayers (it is 
important that different classes of ratepayers – residential, business and farms – are 
stratified appropriately), these surveys need not be prohibitively expensive and can be 
pivotal to a local government communication strategy with residents (reporting survey 
results can allow ratepayers to understand how their preferences compare to those of 
other ratepayers).  
It is also essential to ensure that accurate price signals are sent to all residents – 
getting the pricing right from a supply side approach ensures that demand is tempered 
by willingness to pay (Grant and Drew, 2017). We note that enabling legislation 
prescribes a supply-side approach that includes the costs associated with the 
establishment, operation, maintenance, improvement and replacement of services and 
service infrastructure (see the Local Government Act (1999) s155(5), s188(2)). 
Estimating long-run marginal cost is tricky, but in a rate cap environment absolutely 
critical for long-term financial sustainability. Moreover, communicating the value of 
subsidies and ensuring that they accurately target those in need of support ensures 
that residents and businesses appropriately value local government goods and 
services. 
The introduction of a rate cap regime also highlights the importance of ensuring that 
financial assistance grants (FAGs) are distributed according to the objectives of 
the enabling legislation (horizontal fiscal equalisation which is the principle that all 
local governments should be able, through reasonable effort, provide an equitable level 
of services to citizens – see s3(2)(b) of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) 
Act CTH 1995). For various reasons the HFE objective of the Act has never been 
achieved and the impending imposition of a rate cap regime provides new impetus to 
lobby for this failure to be addressed as a matter of urgency (see, Grant and Drew, 
2017) 
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7. Conclusion and Major 
Recommendations 
Ultimately, the decision regarding whether to introduce a rate cap regime is a matter for 
state politicians. What seems to be especially important at this juncture in time is for 
the local government sector to put forward evidence-based recommendations for 
amendments to the proposed Bill and methodology in order that the negative side-
effects of a rate cap regime, if implemented, are minimised. This Report provides the 
robust and evidence-based foundation necessary for implementation which minimises 
deleterious effects and maximises asserted benefits. 
It will take time to put in place the measures that are necessary to deal with a rate cap 
environment effectively, and it will take considerable time to construct appropriate 
indexes for the various classes of council. The fact that even at this late stage in the 
debate detail is so sketchy suggests that none of the affected parties (including the 
state government) can truly make a sober and fully informed evaluation of the proposal. 
Thus our major recommendation to the state government, ESCOSA and the local 
government sector is to defer the introduction of the proposed Bill for at least one full 
rating cycle so that all of the critical preparation work can be done. Little will be 
achieved in the long-run by rushing through a Bill and regulatory structure that is not fit-
for-purpose, or imposing a rate cap regime on a local government sector and its 
ratepayers that are not ready for it.  
The following list of 13 recommendations should be implemented in order to ensure 
that any rate cap regime ultimately implemented is fit-for-purpose and sustainable: 
1. Ideally rate capping should be considered only as a potential component of 
a suite of measures designed to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and 
sustainability of local government. In particular a contemporary, robust 
and evidence based inquiry is important to ensure no deleterious and 
unanticipated interaction effects arise. 
2. A comprehensive and ongoing suite of performance measures are 
required to support implementation, council response to implementation 
(including requests for rate cap variation determinations), and to allow for an 
evidence-based review of the legislation by a truly independent party in due 
course. Indeed, a suitable performance monitoring regime would also 
perform a critical early warning function and should automatically trigger a 
rate cap variation application if certain metrics deteriorate (which would 
further reduce political costs). 
3. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill to 
ensure that it does not disproportionally disadvantage councils in high 
growth areas, or councils where growth is ‘lumpy’. The solution to this 
problem is to use actual number of assessments issued divided by 4 (which 
yields a weighted number of properties). 
4. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill to 
ensure that it does not widen the gap in inter-jurisdictional inequity over 
time. The solution to this problem is to (i) seek, as much as practical, to 
equalise revenue effort prior to the commencement of the regime, (ii) 
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instruct ESCOSA to pay regard to revenue effort when arriving at rate cap 
recommendations (which implies the need for different classes of caps), and 
when assessing rate cap variation determinations, and (iii) ensure that local 
government financial assistance grants are being allocated on a horizontal 
fiscal equalisation basis (as stipulated in the enabling legislation). 
5. Changes should be made to the proposed methodology and draft Bill to 
ensure that it specifically takes account of capacity to pay (which was an 
objective of the policy). The solution is to direct ESCOSA to have due 
regard to revenue effort when recommending the cap, and when assessing 
rate cap variation determinations. The effect on revenue effort should be 
one of the criteria for the review of the legislation. 
6. Current levels of rating need to be interrogated to ensure that the underlying 
assumption essential for the Bill to attain its objectives - that initial rating 
positions reflect both need and willingness to pay – are indeed valid. 
To ensure that this assumption is valid initial positions should be empirically 
interrogated (with respect to need and revenue effort), and willingness to 
pay should be gauged through consultations conducted proximate to the 
introduction of rate capping. The Bill should be delayed for one complete 
rate cycle to provide councils with the opportunity to ensure that initial rating 
positions are consistent with the implied assumptions of any rate cap 
regime. 
7. The proposed rate cap regime must respond to demographic shifts. 
Once again, this suggests the need for revenue effort to be calculated and 
used when recommending the cap and assessing rate cap variation 
determinations.  
8. The rate cap Bill and methodology must include a catch-up provision. 
Without a catch up provision, councils will be incentivised to increase 
general rates by the maximum cap in each period, which will likely result in 
outcomes contrary to the Bill’s intent. Adding a catch-up provision to the 
legislation is a relatively simple remedy to the problem identified and also 
provides councils with the flexibility to respond to local economic shocks. 
9. The rate cap should be tailored to specific classes of councils. Given 
the extensive empirical evidence on local government expenditure functions 
in Australia, it is clear that at least four caps should be proposed each year 
(one for urban, regional, rural and growth councils respectively). Failure to 
employ appropriate and tailored indexes will result in rate caps that don’t 
reflect the costs faced by most councils (certainly councils outside of the 
capital city), rate caps that cause confusion among the public about what 
represents an ‘undue cost of living increase’, relatively more rate cap 
variation determination applications (most notably from non-capital city local 
governments), and increased risk of council insolvency. To buy cheap 
methodology is to buy dear in the long-term. 
10. To ensure both independence and political accountability the rate cap 
should be set according to a two-stage process. In the first stage, 
independence is achieved by having ESCOSA make its public 
recommendations for the various classes of councils (fully detailing the 
basis for same). In the second stage, political accountability is introduced by 
having the Minister declare the rate caps that will be applied (detailing the 
basis for his declaration if it differs to the ESCOSA recommendation). Rate 
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cap announcements must be crafted carefully so that it is clear that the rate 
cap simply conveys the maximum rate increase that should apply to a 
‘typical’ council that is not facing unmet community need, financial 
sustainability concerns or infrastructure backlogs. The statement should 
also clearly convey that it is prudent for councils that require additional 
revenues to apply for a rate cap variation determination. 
11. The inflationary factor used to guide rate cap determinations should 
meet the following desirable characteristics: accepted by stakeholders, 
resistant to manipulation, transparent, representative of actual unit 
costs and the contribution that they make to typical local government 
expenditure, empirically robust and reliable. The likely cost of 
assembling an appropriate robust and reliable indicator should not be 
allowed to undermine the objectives of the Bill. Indeed, constructing an 
appropriate index will reduce the need for rate cap variation determinations, 
and hence is a sound investment. 
12. Individual councils and the Local Government Association should consider 
collecting comprehensive data on unit costs for local government 
expenditures, which will guide recommendations, requests for rate cap 
variation determinations, and review of the Bill. This will become particularly 
important if Recommendation 11 is not taken up. 
13. The review of the Bill must not be completed by the parties responsible for 
implementation of the rate cap regime (ESCOSA or the Minister’s Office) to 
avoid clear moral hazard. Moreover, the review should be considered by the 
Parliament that passes the Bill to ensure an efficient and politically 
accountable process. 
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Appendices 
A1. Proportion of Revenue from Sale of Goods and Services (per cent), 2016-17 
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A3. Proportion of Revenue from Other Revenue (per cent), 2016-17 
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A5. Proportion of Revenue from Grants and Subsidies (per cent), 2016-17 
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A7. Total Revenue Annual Growth Rates (per cent) Including Grants and 
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